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WILLINGNESS TO PAY FOR INDEX BASED LIVESTOCK INSURANCE:                
RESULTS FROM A FIELD EXPERIMENT IN NORTHERN KENYA 
 
 
Abstract 
Index based livestock insurance (IBLI) is designed for managing livestock asset risk by 
compensating for location-averaged livestock mortality estimated using remotely sensed 
measures of vegetative cover on rangelands. This paper uses a double-bounded 
contingent valuation technique to elicit willingness to pay (WTP) for IBLI among 
pastoralists in five arid and semi-arid locations in northern Kenya, where the product is 
scheduled for pilot sale in 2010. A sequential insurance decision was considered. 
Pastoralists were first asked to make decision regarding the proportion of herd they wish 
to insure. Conditional on their chosen proportion, they were then asked a sequence of 
dichotomous WTP questions, responses of which were used to form bounds for their 
unobserved WTP. A modified Heckman’s two-step conditional expectation correction 
approach is applied to estimate pastoralists’ insurance demand. Wealth, risk preference, 
perceived basis risk and subjective expectation of loss serve as the key WTP 
determinants, conditional on understanding of the mechanics and value of IBLI. 
Households most vulnerable to falling into poverty trap were also shown to have the 
highest price elasticity of demand, despite their potentially highest dynamic welfare gain 
from the insurance. This is in contrast to the high and relatively low elasticity of demand 
found among the poorest, whose dynamic welfare benefits from insurance were minimal. 
 
Keywords: Index insurance, field experiment, willingness to pay elicitation, contingent 
valuation, risk preference, pastoralists, Kenya 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Among more than three million pastoralist majorities in northern Kenya, widespread 
livestock mortality that often results from severe drought is considered the main threat to 
the key asset that their livelihoods rely on. Especially in this pastoral economy with 
evidence of a poverty trap characterized by a herd threshold that leads to bifurcation in 
herd growth prospect (Lybbert et al. 2004, McPeak 2004, Barrett et al. 2006 and Santos 
and Barrett 2006), the presence of catastrophic risk of livestock loss can place long-term 
impacts on households’ welfare dynamics, especially if shocks knock their herd beneath 
the threshold onto the decumulating growth trajectory toward an irreversible poverty trap. 
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With a dearth of alternative productive livelihood strategies to pursue and scant informal 
risk-management options, which often fail to provide safety nets in the event of covariate 
shock, development of a formal asset risk management instrument for pastoralists in 
these areas thus could provide significant pro-poor contribution.  
 Index-based livestock insurance (IBLI) is developed as a means for managing 
covariate livestock mortality risk in arid and semi-arid locations in northern Kenya. To 
ensure IBLI’s potential as a market viable insurance product in the targeted infrastructure 
deficit areas, the innovations in the design of the product, like other index insurance, aim 
at solving the classic incentive problems that currently impede the existence of formal 
insurance market in these poor communities. Like typical insurance, IBLI compensates 
for livestock loss. But unlike traditional insurance, it only compensates for the covariate 
herd losses that are objectively and transparently observable. The increasingly popular 
remotely sensed Normalized Differential Vegetation Index (NDVI), an indicator of 
vegetative cover on rangelands, is used to predict covariate herd mortality in a particular 
location. An objectively measured predicted herd mortality index constructed from such 
strong predictive relationship is then used to trigger IBLI’s indemnity payments for the 
insured in such coverage area. 
 This product design thus has great potential as the transaction costs of monitoring 
and verification are reduced, and it avoids the twin asymmetric information problems 
once the underlying index can not be influenced by insurer or insuree. The risk 
management effectiveness of IBLI, however, depend on severity of “basis risk”, which 
refers to the imperfect correlation between an insured’s potential livestock loss 
experience and the behavior of the underlying index on which the index insurance payout 
is based. As the product is scheduled for pilot sale in Marsabit district of northern Kenya 
in 2010, investigations of IBLI’s risk management effectiveness and its effective demand 
in these targeted communities thus naturally become the next critical research agenda.   
 On the basis of a successfully designed IBLI contract for Marsabit district of 
northern Kenya in Chantarat et al. (2009a), Chantarat et al. (2009b) uses panel data and a 
dynamic pastoral economic model to perform a household-level simulation analysis of 
the effectiveness of IBLI contracts in managing asset risk in 4 locations in Marsabit. This 
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study shows that performance of IBLI varies greatly across households and locations with 
different natures of exposures and basis-risk characteristics. More strikingly, the impact 
of insurance on household’s welfare dynamics is shown to be significantly influenced by 
household’s herd size relative to the critical herd threshold – which was found to be 
around 15-20 TLU1 per household. The poorest (with herd sizes less than the critical 
threshold), who already slowly collapse toward destitution over time are shown to benefit 
the least from the product. IBLI is shown to be most valuable for those with larger herd 
sizes than the threshold but are still vulnerable to falling beneath it, when it helps stem 
collapses into poverty following a bad shock. But their valuation may still not meet the 
market viable rate.2 So these simulated results imply that pastoralists with large herds are 
expected to be the key drivers for the commercially viable product. 
To complement the existing simulation results, this paper elicits willingness to 
pay (WTP) and demand for IBLI contracts among pastoralists using contingent valuation 
experiment conducted in summer of 2008 in 5 overlapping arid and semi-arid locations in 
Marsabit district. Our key objectives are to explore (i) determinants of IBLI demand, (ii) 
patterns of estimated demand and (iii) how IBLI demand varies across subpopulations in 
the presence of a threshold-based poverty trap. These insights would provide implications 
for commercializing and using IBLI as part of poverty alleviation program in the region.  
The empirical work in this paper involves three interrelated field activities: (i) the 
baseline survey and preference elicitation, (ii) the experimental insurance game designed 
to educate sampled households about the newly introduced insurance contract and (iii) 
the WTP elicitation using contingent valuation. Our insurance demand elicitation 
deviates from the (small) existing literatures in many ways. First, we model a more 
realistic sequential insurance decision in which respondent first makes coverage decision 
(e.g., by choosing proportion of herd they wish to insure) and then WTP decision 
conditional on the chosen coverage. Second, we apply double bounded CV method that 
allows us to confine household’s unobserved WTP into small well-defined intervals using 
                                                 
1 TLU stands for tropical livestock unit. This term is commonly used to represent an aggregate unit of 
animals, where 1 TLU is equivalent to 1 cattle, 10 goat or sheep and 0.7 camels. 
2 For the poorest, the premium payment tends to further speed up their herd de-cumulation during good 
seasons. By the same token, the vulnerable households, who may benefit the most from IBLI during bad 
years, also weigh in the cost of increasing probability of herd collapsing when paying in premium without 
receiving indemnity in the good years. 
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a series of dichotomous WTP questions. A modified Heckman’s two step estimation is 
then applied in our empirical estimations.  
Our empirical results offer modest verifications to the neoclassical theoretical 
prediction regarding demand for insurance. Wealth, risk preference, perceived basis risk 
and subjective expectation of loss were found to serve as the key WTP determinants, 
conditional on understanding of the mechanics and perceived value of IBLI. The modest 
estimated WTPs were used to construct an aggregate demand for IBLI, which were 
shown to be highly price elastic. Variations in IBLI demand are also well observed. The 
poorest subpopulations were found to choose significantly larger IBLI coverage and 
exhibit relatively lower price elasticity of demand, while households most vulnerable to 
falling into poverty trap were shown to have the highest price elasticity of demand. Our 
empirical results thus offer an insightful contrast to that of Chantarat et al. (2009b) in the 
current analysis of IBLI contract. 
 In the next section, we offer a brief review of literatures on demand for 
agricultural insurance and the current applications of contingent valuation especially 
those related to agricultural insurance, which then allow us to describe key deviations of 
our approach. Section 3 describes our analytical framework, which allows us to develop 
some theoretical predicting regarding to the determinants of demand for IBLI. Section 4 
then describes our survey and experiment. Econometric framework is then described in 
Section 5. And the empirical results are provided in Section 6. Section 7 constructs 
aggregate IBLI demand and explores how it varies across subpopulations. Section 8 
concludes with some implications. 
 
2. Demand for agricultural insurance and contingent valuation 
To date, there are modest numbers of literatures that study agricultural insurance demand. 
And despite the fact that applications of index insurance in agricultural has been widely 
explored over the last decade, the number of literatures that focus particularly on the 
demand for index-based products are still small. Two comparable approaches have been 
used in these existing literatures.  
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The first approach uses revealed preference concept in estimating latent demand 
for hypothetical insurance based dynamic modeling of household’s optimal agricultural 
decisions. Gautam et al. (1994) uses two-year panel data to examine the efficiency of 
drought management strategies used by peasant households in five villages in southern 
India, and found some evidence of market viable latent demand for drought insurance in 
the region. The same approach was utilized in Burkina Faso by Sakurai and Reardon 
(1997), who found that farmer’s perceived probabilities of droughts and the size of 
cultivated area have positive impacts on insurance demand, while off-farm income and 
availability of public and private assistance have negative impacts on insurance demand. 
The second approach involves application of field survey and experiment in 
eliciting household’s insurance demand. The common approach, which is also widely 
used to estimate the value of goods and services that are not traded in the marketplace, is 
the contingent valuation (CV) method, in which survey questions elicit respondents’ 
willingness to pay (Mitchell and Carson 1989, Carson and Hanemann 2005, Alberini and 
Kahn 2006).  
Arrow et al. (1993) study the applications of CV and provides insightful 
recommendations to maximize the reliability of CV estimates, among those relevant to 
our study are: (1) use of representative sample, (2) phasing CV questions in the form of 
hypothetical referenda in which respondents are told how much they would have to pay 
for each product or scenario choice before asking them to cast a simple yes or no answer, 
(3) reminding respondents of their actual budget constraint when considering their 
willingness to pay, (4) providing some sort of a “would not choose” option in addition to 
the “yes” and “no” option on the referendum, (5) breaking down willingness to pay by a 
variety of respondent’s characteristics and (6) pretesting of the CV questionnaires. Our 
CV experiment adhered to each of these recommendations. 
 A small literature applies CV methods to study WTP for agricultural insurance. 
Patrick (1988) and Vandeveer and Loehman (1994) use a single dichotomous (yes/no) 
choice question to study producers’ demand for a multiple peril crop insurance, rainfall 
insurance and other modifications of crop insurance. McCarthy (2003) and Sarris et al. 
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(2006) use similar single CV question to study pattern of demand for rainfall insurance in 
Morocco and Tanzania, respectively.  
Our approach deviates from others in three interesting ways. First, we model 
household’s demand for IBLI as a sequential decision. Households were first asked 
pastoralists to choose a proportion of their herd (among 0%, 25%, 50%, 75% and 100%) 
that they wish to insure. And so conditional on their chosen proportion, they were then 
asked a series of dichotomous WTP questions. This is contrastable with the standard joint 
decision approach widely used in the literature, in which respondent are asked to consider 
insurance contracts with pre-specified combinations of coverage and price (e.g., full 
coverage contract in which pastoralists are required to insure all their herd). As in reality, 
we cannot observe households’ total herd sizes prior to their insurance decision – but 
rather the herd sizes households are willing to insure – and various literatures related to 
agricultural insurance provide evidence that the insured acreages vary across producers 
and far from full coverage (Barnett et al. 2004, Miranda and Venedov 2001, among 
others), the standard, pre-specified coverage insurance question may not well replicate 
the actual insurance decision.  
Second, we use double-bounded CV method, in which pastoralists were asked a 
sequence of dichotomous insurance questions that progressively narrows down the range 
of their unobserved WTP. Specifically, pastoralists were first asked to consider a specific 
insurance and if they are willing to pay at a specific price.3 A follow-up question with 
higher (lower) price are then asked if they response “yes” (“no”) to the first question, and 
the process continues until we can classify their willingness to pay into 8 different 
intervals classified using 7 prices (actuarial fair, ± 10%, ± 30% and ± 50% of the fair 
price).  
Our method has been shown to generate more efficient estimates than those based 
on a single question (Hanemann et al. 1991) or based on an open-ended follow-up 
                                                 
3 The starting prices of (actuarial fair, 10% and 30% of fair price) were randomized across households to 
take into account the potential first-impression bias. 
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question (Watson and Ryan 2007, Haab and McConnell 2002).4 And since our approach 
is an extension of the standard ones, it allows us to also estimate the WTP estimates 
elicited using the standard methods for comparison and robustness check. And for our 
last deviation, we add “not sure” to the “yes” and “no” answers of each CV question to 
allow uncertain answers to be submitted without introducing bias in estimates of WTP. 
In the context of the index insurance product already available in the market, Gine 
et al. (2008) and Cole et al. (2009) study the patterns of adoption of rainfall insurance 
product designed to compensate low-income Indian farmers in case of deficit rainfall. 
Using series of randomized field experiment, they found that among the relatively low 
level of adoption, price, trust and credit constraints were the three critical demand 
determinants. They also found that uninformed risk-averse households are unwilling to 
experiment with this insurance product, given their limited experience with it. Our 
empirical results will offer great contrast to these studies as well. 
 
3. Analytical framework  
Consider a pastoral economy where there are two sources of wealth for household i in 
location l at any period t: stochastic livestock )0( ≥iltH  and deterministic non-livestock 
wealth )0( ≥iltW , which includes income from non-livestock activities, crop stocking and 
other assets that household can liquidate for consumption and investment. The liquidity 
constraint is imposed through non-negative wealth (Deaton 1991). Since livestock are 
central to economic activities in this economy, we use livestock unit (TLU) as the 
standard monetary unit in this model. Livestock production, the main source of income, is 
determined by ),( iltilt XHf , where iltX  represents household-specific characteristics.  
The stochastic herd accumulation dynamics in this setting can be written as 
 
(1)  ( ) iltiltltltiltiltiltiltltiltiltltilt HhmndvimiHXndvimXndvibH )),(ˆ(),,(),,(1 *1 πεε ++−+=+ . 
 
                                                 
4 A single question CV method requires researcher to choose a distribution of offer price and so inefficient 
set of prices may impact mean WTP. Research also found that people commonly gave “protest answers” to 
open-ended questions.  
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where net herd growth rate is governed by stochastic biological rates of reproduction, 
iltb , and mortality, iltm , which are subjected to two distinctive sources of risk: a covariate 
component driven by rangeland conditions captured by the area-average vegetation index 
)( ltndvi , and a component )( iltε  uncorrelated with the former and idiosyncratic across 
heterogeneous households. Household’s the net livestock investment rate (herd 
recruitment less offtake rates) is represented by ilti .  
 The index based livestock insurance (IBLI) contract is designed to protect 
livestock asset losses due to covariate rangeland condition by providing uniform 
compensation across households in the same geological coverage based on observations 
of ltndvi . Specifically, an annual IBLI contract in location l makes total indemnity payout 
(as a rate proportionate to household’s choice of insured livestock) at the end of coverage 
year t if the predicted livestock mortality index for the location denoted by )(ˆ ltndvim  
reaches the pre-determined strike level *m (at 10% in this study) according to5 
 
(2) ( ) ( )0,)(ˆ),(ˆ ** mndvimMaxmndvim ltltlt −=π . 
 
The annual premium rate ρ  (typically equals to )( ltEa π  with a represent premium 
loading) is quoted as percentage of household’s total value of insured livestock, iltilt Hh  
with ilth  representing proportion (%) of herd household chooses to insure. This annual 
premium then needs to be paid in by the insuree at the beginning of the coverage year.  
Household i’s budget constraint in each period t can therefore be given by 
 
(3) ( ) iltiltiltiltiltiltiltilt HhWWXHfic ρ−−+≤+ +1),(   , 
 
                                                 
5 The agricultural calendar in northern Kenya can be disaggregated into two seasons: short rains/ short dry, 
long rains/ long dry – each consists of a rain and dry season pair. The actual annual contract is designed to 
have two possible indemnity payment dates at the end of each season in a year. Since the time index here 
represents year, the payment at the end of the period represents the sum of the two seasonal payments. For 
details on IBLI design, see Chantarat et al (2009a). 
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where iltc  represents consumption and 1+− iltilt WW  reflects other liquid wealth (e.g., from 
other non-livestock income, transfer, etc.) left from carrying over to the next period. 
So at the beginning of each year t when state of the world is unknown, household 
i first chooses the optimal livestock investment and insurance to maximize the standard 
intertemporal discounted utility. The state of the world is realized at the end of the year 
and so IBLI makes indemnity payment to compensate for livestock loss, which then adds 
to the livestock accumulation dynamics in (1).  
Household i’s optimization problem can be characterized using Bellman’s 
equation as 
 
(4) ( ) =iltt HV Max
iltilt hi ,
 ( )( )iltiltiltiltiltiltilt iHhWWXHfu −−−+ + ρ1),(    
                 ( )( ))),(ˆ(,,|)( *11 mndvimndviHVE ltltiltltiltilttti πεδ Ω+ ++  
 
where )( iltcu  is defined with respect to household-specific CRRA, iR . Here iδ  is 
discount rate and )(⋅tE  is taken over household’s subjective expectation based on a set of 
belief ( ))),(ˆ(,, *mndvimndvi ltltiltltilt πεΩ  with respect to nature of individual livestock 
losses and potential of IBLI in managing the losses with respect to vegetation index (i.e., 
basis risk), which may or may not reflect the real state of the world.  
 In this setting where household is considering a hypothetical IBLI, we consider a 
sequential insurance decision, in which household first chooses the optimal proportion of 
herd to insure, *ih , without prior knowledge of the actual IBLI premium. Conditional on 
their optimal insurance decision and beliefs – which also govern their expectation of the 
IBLI premium – the household’s equilibrium conditions to (4) imply an optimal 
insurance decision written in a reduced form as 
 
(5) ( )( )iltiltiltltltiltltiltiii XWHmndvimndviRhh ,,,)),(ˆ(,,,, ** πεδ Ω= . 
 
 10
Evaluating the insurance decision at the self-insurance equilibrium (without 
IBLI), an equilibrium premium rate – which makes household indifferent between 
purchasing or not purchasing IBLI and so representing household’s maximum 
willingness to pay for IBLI conditional on their chosen insuring proportion, *ih  – can also 
be written in a reduced form as 
 
(6) ( ) ( )( )iltiltiiltltltiltltiltiiii XWhHmndvimndviRh ,,,,)),(ˆ(,,,, **** πεδρρ Ω= . 
 
Preferences, subjective beliefs, wealth and other household-specific 
characteristics thus serve as the key determinants of household’s insurance decision in 
our setting. And theoretical predictions can be made regarding insurance demand 
determinants according to a standard neoclassical model. 
First, with respect to household’s preference, WTP will be increasing in risk 
aversion and decreasing in household’s discount rate in a setting without asymmetric 
information (e.g., households fully understand the insurance contract). Second, with 
respect to their subjective expectation and beliefs, WTP will be increasing in household’s 
perceived livestock mortality risk and in household’s expected insurance payout taking 
into account the perceived basis risk associated with IBLI product (e.g., the correlations 
between individual mortality losses and the predicted mortality index that governs IBLI 
indemnity payout).  
Third, by the standard wealth effect, household’s income and assets represent the 
extent of financial resource to afford IBLI, which have positive impact on insurance 
decision. As the welfare impact of a formal risk management instrument like IBLI 
depends largely on the effectiveness of the existing risk-coping mechanisms (Townsend 
1994, Morduch 1995), household’s wealth could also reflect availability of existing self-
insurance capacity and so could have negative impact on insurance decision. 
Theoretically, wealth thus could have ambiguous impact on insurance decision. 
By similar token, degree of credit constraint also plays key but ambiguous role in 
household’s WTP for insurance. On one hand, credit constrained households may value 
reduction in asset risk provided by IBLI more highly because they have lesser ability to 
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smooth consumption ex post by other means. On the other hand, the shadow value of 
their needy liquid asset may be too high to make IBLI attractive. 
Many of these predictions have been empirically verified especially in the 
insurance markets in developed countries. However, factors that deviate the economic 
setting away from full information – e.g., household’s awareness, ability to understand 
the product and trust that condition their perceived cost and benefit of IBLI – are shown 
theoretically and empirically to influence demand for insurance and other financial 
instruments (Guiso et al. 2007, Gine et al. 2008 and Cole et al. 2009). These factors are 
expected to serve as important demand determinants for a new product like IBLI among 
the targeted pastoralist clients in northern Kenya with very limited knowledge and 
experience of insurance. 
 
4. The survey 
Five arid and semi-arid pastoral locations in Marsabit district – consisting of Dirib 
Gombo, Kargi, Karare, Logologo and North Horr (shown in Figure 1) – were chosen for 
this study. They represent variability in climate, geographical resources, pastoralism, 
ethnic majorities and market access. The sample was stratified by wealth class: low, 
medium and high, based on owned herd size classified by community standards.6 For the 
sample size of 42 households in each location, approximately 14 households were 
randomly drawn from these location-wealth strata.7 Three survey activities were 
conducted in the field starting in June 2008: (i) baseline household survey, (ii) 
educational insurance game and (iii) willingness to pay experiment using CV.  
 
Baseline survey 
Table 1 presents weighted summary statistics from the survey on household 
characteristics, risk perceptions, 11-year historical herd loss recalls since 1997 and simple 
                                                 
6 Wealth classification standards vary by location. The boundaries in TLU for (L,M,H) wealth class for the 
five locations are Dirib( <3,3-8,>8), Kargi(<15, 15-25,>25), Karare(<15,15-30,>30), Logologo( <10,10-
25,>25) and North Horr( <15,15-35,>35). 
7 All reported statistics and estimations in this study are thus corrected for their appropriate sampling 
weights. 
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experimental elicited preferences. Details of our constructed variables are described in 
Appendix 1. 
Pastoral households in our studied locations are generally poor with reported 
mean per capital income less than $0.5 a day.8 Livestock is considered the main source of 
livelihood for households in these pastoral communities with an average of 63% share of 
livestock income from total income. Livestock also serve as their main asset with mean 
herd size of 15 TLU per household consisting on average of six individuals. Livestock 
and other asset holdings in these communities, however, vary greatly across our sampled 
households. 36% of sampled households were identified as credit constrained, e.g., 
indicating demand for credit without capacity to access from any formal/informal 
sources. 
Pastoralism in these arid and semi-arid areas is nomadic in nature, where herders 
commonly adapt to spatiotemporal variability in forage and water availability through 
herd migration. This can be shown by the 68% share of herd reported to migrate at least 
once over the year. Very low years of education are generally observed among the 
household heads. Their experience with financial transactions also seems very limited 
with 7% of sample reported having bank accounts. 15% of the sampled households, 
however, reported their active involvement in the local social network groups – mostly 
related to livestock production, marketing and other livelihood activities. 
Our risk ranking exercise shows that the covariate livestock loss due to inadequate 
rain and forage was the most concerned risk, of which households had difficulty coping 
given their resources. The existing risk management strategies in these communities, 
which clearly fail to provide adequate protection against such loss, were ranked from 
utilization of assets and savings (e.g., selling off livestock), obtainment of credit, 
reduction of consumption and outside assistance, e.g., food aid. Apart from migration, 
decreasing herd size (e.g., through loaning and sales) was the main precautionary action 
undertook in expectation of catastrophic herd loss. Appendix 2 reports these statistics.  
To obtain insight of household’s profile of risk of livestock loss, 11-year herd loss 
recalls were conducted, in which household heads were asked to approximate beginning 
                                                 
8 This is based on October 2009 exchange rates (75.05KSh/US$). 
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herd sizes and annual losses since 1997.9 The 11-year recalls imply an average of 18% 
probabilities (one in about five years) of the occurrence of catastrophic herd loss, e.g., 
beyond 200% of individual-specific mean. Correlations of individual and area averaged 
herd losses beyond 10% based on these recalls – a weak representation of basis risk 
associated with IBLI – are relatively high at an average of 0.53, but vary greatly across 
households. Pastoralists expected an average of 34% livestock loss over the year 2009, 
which represents the coverage period for the hypothetical IBLI they were asked to 
consider.  
As preference represents a key determinant for household’s insurance demand, we 
elicit risk, time and ambiguity preference using simple experiments with real monetary 
incentives. Our risk preference elicitation game follows the method used in Binswanger 
(1980, 1981), Eckel and Grossman (2002) and Barr (2003). Households were first given 
100 Ksh – an equivalent of one day wage in the areas – for their 2-hour survey 
participation. They were then asked if they would like to use it to play one of the five 
lotteries, which vary by risk and expected return. Six categorizations of risk aversion 
(similar to Binswanger 1980) associated with six geographic mean CRRA were derived 
based on households’ choices (see Appendix 3 for the setting of this experiment). 
We elicit household’s discount rates from the minimum compensation household 
would be willing to accept in exchange for their one-month postponement of 10,000 KSh 
cash receipt. The result implies extremely high mean discount rate of 52% per month.10  
Household’s ambiguity preference was then estimated by observing their choice between 
the two games they would play for real prize: one with known winning probability and 
the other with “ambiguous” outcome probability. 52% of the sample was found to be 
ambiguity averse. Appendix 1 describes these experiments in more detail. 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 Calendar of important events in each location was used to aid the recalls. 
10 Hypothetic setting is used in this experiment. The high discount rates might also capture high degree of 
liquidity constraints among the sampled households in these communities. They might also potentially 
result from cultural issues provoked by the framing of this experiment. For example, delaying payment in 
northern Kenya tend to have high indication of default. Thus, people would rather choose to receive sure 
money now than nothing a month from now. The evidence of considerable high discount rates are also 
found theoretically and empirical in Lybbert and McPeak (2009), Gine et al. (2008). 
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Educational insurance game 
After the baseline survey, households were then invited to join one of IBLI sessions 
conducted twice repeatedly in each location. Each session started with a brief 
introduction of IBLI and then followed by intensive educational insurance game 
constructed to replicate real pastoral livelihood in the areas. The game with options to 
buy IBLI contracts were played repeatedly with real monetary incentive aiming to 
develop pastoralists’ understanding of how IBLI works and the potential impact of IBLI 
on herd dynamics. At the end of the game, we then conducted group discussion about 
related questions and opinions on IBLI products, the response of which seem to indicate 
these sampled households’ interest and eagerness to learn more about IBLI (see Lybbert 
et al. 2009 and McPeak et al. 2009 for details on this experimental game). 
 
Willingness to pay experiment using CV 
Already informed about IBLI, the sampled households were then followed by 
enumerators for CV experiment. An annual IBLI contract with 10% strike and two 
possible indemnity payouts at the end of each of the two seasons in the 2009 coverage 
year was introduced.11 Households were also told that the predicted mortality index will 
be constructed and announced at the end of each season by the International Livestock 
Research Institute (ILRI) – independent of the insurance company. The bottom of Table 1 
presents statistics of the predicted NDVI-based mortality index that triggers indemnity 
payout from this contract. The average actuarial fair premium rate is estimated to be 6.8% 
of the total insured herd value.  
After the actual contract introduction, household were first asked to choose the 
insurance coverage, e.g., the proportion of herd they would like to insure among 0%, 
25%, 50%, 75% and 100% (without knowing price information). Five starting offer 
prices (fair price, 10% and 30% above and below fair price) were then randomly assigned 
to each household in each wealth group to eliminate the bias resulted from impression of 
the first offer price. Conditional on the chosen coverage proportion, enumerators – 
                                                 
11 30% strike contract was also considered in the WTP experiment. As the 10% strike contract is likely to 
be the actual contract to be piloted in 2010, we focus on this specification. Other results are not reported but 
can be provided upon request. The statistics regarding IBLI are reproduced from Chantarat et al. (2009a). 
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equipped with a calculator – then walked the respondents through (i) the calculations of 
total premium based on the total KSh value of their chosen insured herd (estimated at a 
pre-specified per TLU value at 10,000 KSh)12 and (ii) the calculation of contract’s total 
KSh indemnity payment conditional on various predicted mortality index and the 
respondents’ total insured herd value. The respondents were then asked if they would be 
willing to buy the proposed IBLI contract for their chosen insurance coverage.  
The household could answer “yes”, “no” or “not sure” to the willingness-to-pay 
question. Enumerators were told to carefully distinguish the response of “maybe yes” 
from “definitely yes” through the use of “not sure” for the former one. If the respondent 
answered “yes” (“no”) to the first offer price, enumerators were instructed to repeat the 
WTP question (and calculation routine) with the next higher (lower) price emphasizing in 
each of the renew questions that the contract and price was the only combination 
available in the area at that particular time. The series of WTP questions continue until 
the respondent’s answer changed to “no” (“yes”) within the range of seven available 
prices. If the respondent answered “not sure” to the first offer price, enumerators were 
instructed to repeat the question with the next higher price and continue the process until 
the respondent’s answer changed to “no”, as well as, to repeat the question with the next 
lower price and continue the process until the respondent’s answer changed to “yes”.  
By this routine, the respondents’ unobserved WTP can be narrowed down into 
one of the eight intervals {(0,0.5P), [0.5P,0.7P), [0.7P,0.9P), [0.9P, P), [P,1.1P), 
[1.1P,1.3P), [1.3P,1.5P), [1.5P, +∞ )}, where P represents fair annual premium rate at 
6.8% per insured herd value. The upper (lower) bound of WTP thus reflects the minimum 
(maximum) offer price that households response “no” (“yes”) to the willingness-to-pay 
question. Figure 2 describes the structure of CV questions. In the presence of “not sure” 
response (found in only 5% of sample), we replace the upper bound with the minimum 
offer price that households response “not sure” to narrow down the WTP from some 
potential uncertainty.13  
                                                 
12 The goat/sheep equivalent of the total premium was also calculated for the respondents in case their 
insurance calculation and decision involve selling off some of their herd for premium payment. 
13 The resulting estimated WTP can thus be compared with that of the case without considering “not sure”. 
The WTP estimates from the standard single question (double bounded with only one follow up question) 
method can also be calculated by only taking information observed at the first (first two) willingness-to-pay 
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5. Econometric framework 
Household’s insurance demand in our experiment is thus modeled as a sequential 
decision as they first choose among ordinal coverage choices )( ih  and then make 
willingness to pay decision )( iWTP  conditional on the chosen coverage. And since the 
covariates that determine household’s coverage decision will likely determine their WTP, 
and it is reasonable to assume that there might be some unobserved characteristics that 
influence both decisions, this interdependent insurance decisions can be specified as a 
model with an endogenous ordinal variable. This deviates slightly from a model with 
endogenous binary variable considered extensively in Maddala (1983), Heckman (1979), 
among others. 
 Specifically, household’s sequential insurance decision can be modeled as 
 
(7) 111
*
iii Xh εβ +′=                           , )( jhhi =    if  jij h αα ≤<− *1    for Jj ,3,2,1=  
222
*
iiihi XhWTP εββ +′+=         , ],[ iUiLi ppWTP ∈ . 
 
The unobserved choice of insured livestock proportion *ih is first modeled as ordered 
probit with respect to the observed household’s choice of insured livestock proportion 
chosen among J ordinal choices,14 )( jhi ,.., )(Jhi . Here jα  represents unknown threshold 
parameters with −∞=0α  and +∞=4α .  
Household’s chosen coverage also conditions their willingness to pay for 
insurance. We do not observe *iWTP  but household’s response to the series of CV 
questions allow us to classify their WTP  into one of the eight price interval ],[ iUiL pp , on 
which a bounded likelihood model can be specified. 21 , ii XX  are vectors of covariates. 
The two error terms in the model follows bivariate normal distribution such that 
),,1,0,0(~, 12
2
221 ρσεε BVN . 
                                                                                                                                                 
question (s). We also estimated these results for the purpose of comparison. Results are not reported here 
but can be provided upon request. 
14 In this case, the coverage choices reduced to hi (1) = 0.25, hi (2) =0.50, hi (3) = 0.75 and hi (4) = 1. No 
household in our sample chose 0% coverage and so this choice is automatically dropped. 
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 The overall full information likelihood of household’s interdependent insurance 
decision is thus associated with the probability of joint events, which can be derived from 
conditional probability: Pr( )( jhhi = )Pr( ],[ iUiLi ppWTP ∈ / )( jhhi = ) for 4,3,2,1=j . And 
so, in order to maintain the model’s general specification, the full information maximum 
likelihood specification is first presented as  
(8) 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]∑ ∑
= =
− ⎭⎬
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 for LUK ,=  and 
( ) 1)( ==Ι jhhi  if  )( jhhi =  and = 0 otherwise. )(⋅Φ is the standard normal cumulative 
distribution function. 
 We estimate this model based on limited information maximum likelihood using 
Heckman’s conditional expectation correction. The use of Heckman’s two-step approach 
(Heckit) with first-step ordered probit model and second-step bounded likelihood model 
has not been considered in the literature, to the top of our knowledge. Green (2002) 
discusses the model with first-step ordered probit but second-step linear regression. The 
maximum likelihood estimators ),( 1βα ′  from the first step ordered probit estimation are 
used to estimate conditional expectation correction term, inverse Mills ratio (IMR) iλ , 
associated with the observed )( jhhi = . The estimated IMR is then inserted into the 
second-step double bounded WTP model in place of ih . And so ),( 2ββ h  are then 
estimated using maximum likelihood. We apply Heckman’s correction for standard errors 
in our estimations. Appendix 4 summarizes our approach in applying Heckit and 
correction for covariance matrix in our model. 
 A test of the interdependency of the coverage and WTP decisions (e.g., 
correlation between the errors in (7)) – which provide implication about the suitability of 
model specification – compares the Heckman’s two-step results with the estimated results 
without conditional expectation correction. This is thus identical to the Wald test of the 
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significance of the Heckman correction term (IMR). Therefore, under the null hypothesis 
of no correlation, hβˆ  would be zero (Heckman 1979 and Dubin and McFadden 1981). 
 
6. Empirical results 
Table 2 reports the empirical results for a 10% strike IBLI contract considered in this 
paper.15 Results of the first step ordered probit estimation is shown in the left panel. As 
no one in the sample chooses 0% coverage, there are only four ordinal coverage choices 
(25%, 50%, 75% and 100%). For identification purposes, we include extra variables on 
preference, household and herd characteristics – significantly influencing coverage 
decision in this first step – apart from the standard covariates used in both steps. 
Ambiguity averse household chooses significantly lower coverage. Land holding and the 
extent to which household has at least one member living or working away from the 
community significantly decrease household’s chosen coverage. These availabilities of 
alternative diversifying livelihood or income as self coping strategies thus reduces 
demand for formal insurance. 
 Our empirical results for the coverage decision provide modest verification of the 
theoretical prediction earlier stated. Risk aversion and time preference has no significant 
influence on household’s coverage decision, while in general the effect from their risk 
experience, subjective expectation and perception well confirm the prediction. IBLI 
coverage decision increases significantly with expectation of loss in the coverage year 
and – though less significantly – with the perceived extreme risk of livestock loss 
observed in the 11-year recalls. Bad experience during the last rain season is also show to 
significantly increase coverage proportion. 
 Economic income has significant positive impact on household’s coverage 
decision resulting from the overwhelming wealth effect. In contrast, the significantly 
negative influence of herd size seems to indicate the dominating effect from the buffer 
stock argument. Other thing equal, marginal utility impact from catastrophic shock is 
                                                 
15 We pay particular attention to the 10% contract here as this appears to be the commercial underwriter’s 
preferred specification for pilot sale. Results for the 30% strike contract also included in our experiment are 
qualitatively similar and so are omitted here but are available upon request. 
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expected to be less severe for those with larger herd, whose livestock could also serve as 
buffer assets. The availability of buffer stock assets thus potentially reduces demand for 
insurance. The buffer stock argument also offers plausible explanation for our next result 
that credit constrained households tend to insure significantly larger proportion of herd. 
Since the credit constrained household has less means to cope with catastrophic, they 
would IBLI substantially. Therefore, apart from the wealth impact from income, the 
overall results in this first step ordered probit model seem to suggest that household’s 
coverage decision depends substantially on availability of risk coping and management 
strategies. Lastly, household head’s education level (e.g., whether or not he/she obtain 
some level of secondary, or post-secondary education), which could provide some 
indication of cognitive ability to understand the mechanics and value of IBLI, is shown to 
have positive – but not significant – impact on coverage decision, despite its potential 
role in creating information asymmetry in the overall analysis. 
 Results from the second-step double-bounded likelihood model estimation 
conditional on chosen coverage are shown in the next panel of Table 2. The statistically 
significance of the estimated coefficient of IMR thus confirms the appropriateness of our 
2-step specifications. This also indicates that the household‘s WTP will decrease 
significantly with their chosen coverage. Strikingly, we continue to observe negative – 
but not significant – impact of CRRA on household’s WTP for insurance, which seems 
contradict to the theoretical prediction holding other factors constant. This result, 
however, was also observed in various related literature (e.g., the studies of rainfall 
insurance uptake among farmers in India by Gine et al. 2008 and Cole et al. 2009) who 
argue that the observed evidence could result from deviation away from full-information 
setting and so could reflect the uninformed household’s unwillingness to experiment on 
the newly introduced product. Interacting CRRA with other variables indicating 
household’s familiarity with insurance product, they show that the net impact of CRRA 
turns positive. Using household head’s education as an indicator of their understanding of 
IBLI and so interacting it with CRRA, we also can confirm the net positive impact of 
CRRA – especially among those obtained up to secondary education. 
Other empirical results in the second step WTP estimation are comparable with 
the IBLI coverage decision. Household’s WTP increases significantly with expectation of 
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loss and with income and productive asset. Wealth effect seems to strongly determine 
household’s WTP decision despite the contrasting result pooled from the buffer stock 
argument for the significant negative influence from herd size. Actively involvement in 
social network groups – mostly relating to livestock production, marketing and other 
livelihood strategies, – weakly representing household’s familiarity and openness to 
experiment with financial transactions and instruments, provide significant positive 
impact on WTP for IBLI.  
The net impact of education on WTP for IBLI is still significantly negative in the 
first specification of the second-step WTP estimation. Because education may condition 
information asymmetry in household’s evaluation of IBLI, the last panel on the right of 
Table 2 shows the empirical results when we interact education with household’s 
perceived basis risk, which is decreasing in the correlation between individual and area-
averaged livestock losses beyond 10% observed from the 11-year recalls. Household’s 
perceived correlation of livestock losses conditional on understanding of IBLI contract – 
weakly indicated by education – is shown to have significant positive impact on WTP. 
The net impact of education on WTP in this new specification is shown to be positive.  
In sum, income, availability of coping strategies and household’s expectation of 
loss are found to be the key drivers for insurance coverage decision. Conditional on 
chosen coverage, wealth, risk preference, perceived basis risk and subjective expectation 
of loss thus serve as the key WTP determinants among sampled households, well 
informed about mechanics and value of IBLI contract. Our last specification of the 
second-step estimation is then used to estimate WTP and demand for IBLI. 
 
7. Estimated Demand for IBLI  
Table 3 reports weighted summary statistics of chosen IBLI coverage and the estimated 
WTP for 10% IBLI contract we considered in this paper. The overall mean chosen 
coverage stands at slightly lower than 70%. The mean and median WTP only mark up the 
actuarial fair rate – at 6.8% per annum – by an average of 15%, not enough to generate 
effective demand for the commercially viable contract at a marked up rate of 30-50%, on 
average. The variations of chosen coverage and estimated WTP across herd size terciles 
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are also observed. Though with largest variations, chosen IBLI coverage appears the 
highest – at 95% significant level – among the poorest tercile, on average. Variations in 
both coverage and WTP decrease as we move from the poorer to the richer terciles.  
To further explore how coverage and WTP decision vary with herd size, Figure 3 
estimates non-parametrically the chosen coverage and WTP conditional on observed herd 
sizes. While there is no statistically significant relationship between the estimated WTP 
and herd size, significant inverse relationship between chosen IBLI coverage and herd 
size can be observed among households with less than 40 TLU herd sizes. In sharp 
contrast to the simulated findings in Chantarat et al. (2009b), the poorest sub-population 
seem to express comparable WTP for IBLI as well as to choose the significantly highest 
IBLI coverage among others in these communities. This result arises despite the fact that 
welfare gain from IBLI among this sub-population is shown to be minimal in these 
settings characterized by threshold-based poverty trap. With the bifurcated herd threshold 
identified at around 15-20 TLU, poor households with herd sizes far below can benefit 
from IBLI through reductions of herd variations and/or of probabilities of collapsing into 
destitution, while paying very high prices as periodically premium payment would further 
speed their herd decumulation process. These simulated results from Chantarat et al. 
(2009b), however, ignore the possibilities that IBLI might crowd in finance, investment 
and credit access, which might in turn increase the welfare benefit among these poorest 
sub-population. 
Contrasting results are also found among the households identified as vulnerable, 
e.g., with herd sizes around and slightly larger than the bifurcated herd threshold that 
would still make them vulnerable from collapsing into de-cumulating growth path due to 
catastrophic herd loss. Our results from field experiment shows that they are among the 
sub-populations with the lowest chosen IBLI coverage, despite the simulated results that 
dynamic welfare gain from IBLI of this vulnerable group might be the highest under the 
presence of bifurcated herd threshold, especially if IBLI protects them from collapse into 
non-productive herd growth.  
Using household’s sequential decisions on coverage and WTP, we then proceed to 
construct aggregate demand for IBLI for the five studied locations in Marsabit as 
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following. We first rank all estimated WTP for the household in descending order. 
Households’ quantity demanded at their estimated WTP can be calculated by multiplying 
their chosen coverage herd (chosen coverage (%) multiplied by herd size) by the 
sampling weight corresponding to the households in the sampling location. Aggregate 
demand curve for IBLI can then be constructed, where total quantity demanded a specific 
WTP is calculated by adding the total quantity desired of the immediately larger WTP to 
that of the specific WTP.16 The constructed aggregate demand is shown to be very elastic 
with price elasticity of demand of -2.54. Using the some what closed to the market 
commercial premium rate of at least 30% mark up from the fair rate, effective IBLI 
demand is shown to exist among only 16% of the populations in these 5 studied locations.  
 To explore how IBLI demand vary by herd size in the presence of bifurcated herd 
threshold, we also construct IBLI demand by wealth group classified with respect to the 
critical herd threshold of at least 15 TLU. Specifically, the lowest herd group consists of 
households with herd sizes less than the lower bounds of the critical threshold (e.g., 
between 0-15 TLU) occupying 48% (13%) of population (herd population). The 
vulnerable herd group consisting of those, who are prone to crossing over the critical 
threshold, are confined within one standard deviation above the 15 TLU threshold (e.g., 
between 15-30 TLU) occupying 23% (35%) of population (herd population). Lastly, the 
large herd group occupies the majority of the herd population and thus consists of those 
with at least 30 TLU herd size, well above the critical threshold – and so on expectation 
immune from crossing onto non-productive growth due to shocks. 
Figure 4 presents the constructed aggregate and herd group-specific IBLI demand. 
Price elasticity of demand and summary of effective demand at commercial mark up rates 
are shown in Table 4. Aggregate demand for the vulnerable group is shown to be the 
most elastic with the smallest share of population exhibiting effective demand at the 
commercial mark up rate of 30%-40%. This is in contrast to the demand from the low 
herd group, which is shown to be the least elastic with the largest share of population 
exhibiting effective demand at such commercial viable rates. 
                                                 
16 Aggregate demand curve for IBLI is thus representative for the 5 survey locations. With appropriate 
scaling and sampling assumptions, aggregate demand for Marsabit district can also be constructed. 
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8. Conclusions and implications 
Index based livestock insurance (IBLI) is successfully designed in Chantarat et al. 
(2009a) for managing livestock asset risk by compensating for location-averaged 
livestock mortality estimated using remotely sensed measures of vegetative cover on 
rangelands. This paper uses field experiment to elicit willingness to pay for IBLI among 
sampled pastoralists in Marsabit district, where the product is scheduled for pilot sale in 
2010. Our key objectives are to explore (i) determinants of IBLI demand, (ii) patterns of 
estimated demand and (iii) how IBLI demand varies across subpopulations. These 
empirical results offer a great contrast to that of Chantarat et al. (2009b), which simulates 
effectiveness of IBLI using dynamic model and household panel data in the overlapping 
locations.  
Central to the analysis in these interrelated research works is the existence of 
threshold-based poverty traps in the targeted pastoral locations characterized by at least a 
bifurcated herd threshold that leads to herd growth (decumulation toward destitution) for 
the herd size above (below) it. Theoretical and empirical evidence behind this imply 
important role of risk in the population’s welfare dynamics, the important role of IBLI 
especially in preserving herd growth dynamics and so the variation of IBLI valuation 
induced by such non-linearity. 
Our empirical results offer modest verifications to the neoclassical theoretical 
prediction regarding demand for insurance. Patterns of insurance coverage decision and 
the conditional WTP decisions vary slightly in the two-step estimation, specification of 
which is shown to be appropriate. We found that availability of coping strategies and 
household’s expectation of loss are the key drivers of insurance coverage decision. 
Conditional on the chosen coverage, wealth, risk preference, perceived basis risk and 
subjective expectation of loss thus serve as the key WTP determinants among sampled 
households, well informed about mechanics and value of IBLI contract. The estimated 
WTPs in these communities has, on average, 15% mark up from the actuarial fair rate – 
clearly lower than the commercial viable rates., at which about 16% of the population 
still exhibit effective demand. The constructed aggregate IBLI demand is highly elastic 
with price elasticity of demand at -2.54. 
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 Variations in IBLI demand are well observed. The poorest subpopulation tend to 
choose significantly larger IBLI coverage and exhibit the least price elastic demand, 
despite the simulated results that indicate that their dynamic welfare benefits from IBLI 
were minimal in the presence of threshold-based poverty trap. Households most 
vulnerable to falling into poverty trap were also shown to have the highest price elasticity 
of demand, despite their potentially highest dynamic welfare gain from the insurance.  
Our findings of high price elasticity of demand provide direct implication to the 
commercialization of IBLI. Specifically, this could imply substantial returns to small 
reductions in commercial pricing. The extremely high price elasticity of demand among 
the sub-populations vulnerable to falling into poverty due to shocks further imply great 
potential for using targeted subsidizing IBLI as part of social protection program in the 
region. Barrett et al. 2008 terms this as productive safety net in the sense that it can 
protect the targeted vulnerable non-poor from unnecessarily slipping into a poverty trap 
that they may find hard to escape and that may require greater humanitarian resource. 
Targeted subsidizing IBLI can prove appropriate as a cost effective and sustainable 
poverty reduction program in the areas. Our empirical research implemented in parallel to 
the pilot sale of IBLI in early 2010 will explore greater insight for the optimal 
subsidization scheme using incentive pricing experiments.  
 Our experiment results that indicate great and relatively inelastic demand of IBLI 
among the poorest, who potentially aim to use IBLI to complement their meager means 
of coping with live-threatening losses, further provide great indication of pro-poor, 
humanitarian values of IBLI. The extent to which these potentially credit constrained 
subpopulations could actually afford and benefit from the real commercial contract, 
however, becomes empirical questions.17 What are the key determinants of the actual 
insurance uptake? What are the induced behavior and market impacts of IBLI that might 
facilitate further improvement in welfare dynamics? Agenda of research is underway to 
explore these key issues in parallel to the 2010 pilot sale.  
 
                                                 
17 This is in contrast to the empirical results from Gine et al. 2008 and Cole et al. 2009, who identify that 
credit constraint is one of the main impediment in the uptake of rainfall insurance among Indian farmers, 
and so that the pro-poor impacts of insurance is still very limited. 
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Variables Mean Median S.D. Minimum Maximum
Household and herd characteristics
Household size 6 6 2 2 11
Head is male ( =1 if yes, =0 if no) 0.76 1.00 0.43 0.00 1.00
Head's age (years) 47 48 13 24 90
Head education (1-12 yrs) ( =1 if yes, =0 if no) 0.13 0.00 0.33 0.00 1.00
Head education (>12 yrs) ( =1 if yes, =0 if no) 0.03 0.00 0.18 0.00 1.00
Dependent ratio (%) 46% 50% 22% 0% 86%
Member living away ( =1 if yes, =0 if no) 0.13 0.00 0.33 0.00 1.00
Share of immature (non-adult) livestock (%) 28% 30% 19% 0% 71%
Share of mobiled herd (%) 68% 87% 38% 0% 100%
Per capita annual income and livelihood
Per capita economic income (1,000 KSh)  12.7 6.1 30.3 0.2 323.0
Share of income from: livestock 63% 84% 38% 0% 100%
                                     Salaried employment 7% 0% 23% 0% 99%
                                     Trade and business 8% 0% 21% 0% 96%
                                     Petty trading and casual labor 7% 0% 18% 0% 74%
Assets and credit constraint
Total livestock (TLU) 15.5 12.5 16.8 0.1 130.6
Total landholdings (hectare)         0.5 0.0 1.1 0.0 15.0
Total productive asset (1,000 KSh)       188.8 0.0 1,703.0 0.0 19,100.0
Total non-productive asset (1,000 KSh) 2.6 0.2 6.8 0.0 90.0
Credit constrained ( =1 if yes, =0 if no) 0.36 0.00 0.48 0.00 1.00
Familiarity with financial transactions
Has bank account ( =1 if yes, =0 if no) 0.07 0.00 0.25 0.00 1.00
Actively involved in group(s) ( =1 if yes, =0 if no) 0.15 0.00 0.36 0.00 1.00
Preferences
Risk aversion (CRRA) 0.63 0.70 0.40 0.00 1.00
Discount rate 0.52 0.50 0.31 0.05 1.00
Ambiguity aversion ( =1 if yes, =0 if no) 0.52 1.00 0.50 0.00 1.00
Livestock loss experience and perception
If experienced very bad long rain in 2008( =1 if yes, =0 if no) 0.22 0.00 0.41 0.00 1.00
% of years with livestock loss > 200% own mean 18% 18% 16% 0% 82%
Correlation btw. individual and area losses beyond 10% 0.53 0.62 0.34 -0.36 0.95
Expected livestock loss in 2009 (%) 34% 30% 20% 0% 100%
Summary statistics of IBLI contract
Predicted seasonal NDVI based mortality index* : M(ndvi) 9.1% 4.7% 9.4% 0.0% 46.0%
PR(M(ndvi)>10%) 34.5%
Actuarial fair annual premium at 10% strike 6.8%
Unweighted number of observations 207
Note: We drop 1 household that could not attend the insurance game and CV experiments and 2 households with no livestock.
* The predicted seasonal index is used to trigger IBLI indemnity payment at the end of each of the two seasons in the coverage year.
Table 1: Summary of (weighted) Statistics 
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First stage: Weighted ordered probit model with dependent variable = chosen proportion of insured herd
Second stage: Weighted interval regression model with dependent variable = upper and lower bounds of WTP
Location dummies and constant are included (results omited)
Specifications 2nd: WTP (1) 2nd: WTP (2)
Starting bid 0.31** (0.13) 0.32** (0.13)
IMR -0.25* (0.15) -0.24* (0.15)
Preference
CRRA -0.29 (0.29) -0.60 (0.40) -0.62 (0.40)
CRRA × Head education (1-12 yrs) -1.17 (0.92) 1.53* (0.81) 2.20*** (0.74)
CRRA × Head education (>12 yrs) -0.24 (1.54) 1.19 (1.88) 1.06 (1.82)
Discount rate 0.22 (0.38) -0.69 (0.60) -0.71 (0.60)
Ambiguity aversion ( =1 if yes, =0 if no) -0.48** (0.20)
Livestock loss experience and perception
Experienced very bad long rain 2008 ( =1 if yes, =0 if no) -0.84* (0.54) 0.47 (0.55) 0.46 (0.55)
Probability of m_it>200% mean_i 1.26 (0.90) 0.68 (1.14) 0.53 (1.21)
Correlations (m_it,m_t) 0.22 (0.41) 0.20 (0.55) -0.13 (0.60)
Correlations (m_it,m_t) × Head education (1-12 yrs) 2.43** (1.17)
Correlations (m_it,m_t) × Head education (>12 yrs) 0.71 (1.53)
Expected livestock loss in 2009 1.87** (0.84) 1.89** (0.83) 1.82** (0.82)
Wealth and credit constraint
Ln (income per capita) 0.53*** (0.16) 0.42** (0.18) 0.45*** (0.17)
Ln (total livestock) -0.34** (0.15) -0.91*** (0.17) -0.92*** (0.16)
Ln (productive assets) 0.04 (0.03) 0.12*** (0.04) 0.13*** (0.04)
Ln (nonproductive assets) 0.00 (0.04) -0.11*** (0.04) -0.11*** (0.04)
Credit constrained ( =1 if yes, =0 if no) 0.65** (0.30) 0.56 (0.54) 0.57 (0.53)
Landholding -0.41*** (0.15)
Familiarity with financial transactions
Have bank account ( =1 if yes, =0 if no) -0.63 (0.43) 0.52 (0.90) 0.68 (0.85)
Belong to active network ( =1 if yes, =0 if no) -0.02 (0.26) 1.23*** (0.41) 1.27*** (0.41)
Household and herd characteristics
Household size 0.07 (0.07) 0.20*** (0.07) 0.20*** (0.07)
Head is male ( =1 if yes, =0 if no) -0.52* (0.33) 0.50 (0.40) 0.55 (0.39)
Head age -0.01 (0.01) -0.02 (0.01) -0.02 (0.01)
Head education (1-12 yrs) ( =1 if yes, =0 if no) 0.87 (0.84) -1.91*** (0.72) -3.60*** (0.93)
Head education (>12 yrs) ( =1 if yes, =0 if no) 0.16 (1.05) -0.41 (1.64) -0.81 (1.59)
Dependent ratio -0.69 (0.57)
Member living away ( =1 if yes, =0 if no) -0.62* (0.36)
Proportion of immature animals 0.67 (0.79)
Number of observations 207 207 207
Pseudo adjusted R2 0.29 0.44 0.44
Proportion of correct prediction 0.57
Note: Robust standard erros in parentheses. *significant at 10%, ** 5% and *** 1% respectively.
*Estimations of threshold parameters α1, α2, α3 are omited.
1st: Coverage*
Table 2: Two-step Estimation of IBLI Demand 
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Variables Mean Median S.D. Minimum Maximum
Chosen Coverage (% Herd)
Overall 68.9% 75.0% 30.2% 0.0% 100.0%
1st Tercile 81.2% 100.0% 33.3% 0.0% 100.0%
2nd Tercile 64.4% 50.0% 27.7% 25.0% 100.0%
3rd Tercile 60.0% 50.0% 24.5% 25.0% 100.0%
Estimated WTP (% of insured herd value)
Overall 7.8% 7.7% 1.4% 2.8% 12.0%
1st Tercile 7.6% 7.2% 1.6% 3.0% 12.0%
2nd Tercile 8.0% 8.0% 1.4% 2.8% 11.6%
3rd Tercile 7.6% 7.7% 1.2% 4.2% 10.1%
Note: Herd sizes cut off for 1st and 2nd terciles are 6 TLU and 18 TLU respectively
Herd Group % Population % Herd Elasticity
Population of Demand Fair 1.3×Fair 1.4×Fair
Less than 15 TLU* 0.48 0.13 -2.08 0.61 0.23 0.12
Between 15-30 TLU 0.23 0.35 -3.32 0.65 0.10 0.04
Greater than 30 TLU 0.28 0.53 -2.70 0.69 0.10 0.07
Aggregate 1.00 1.00 -2.54 0.64 0.16 0.09
* 15 TLU is equivalent to the bifurcated herd threshold found in these communities, 30 TLU is equivalent to 1 S.D. above the threshold.
Proportion with effective demand at 
Table 3: Summary of Chosen Coverage and Estimated WTP  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Price Elasticity of IBLI Demand  
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Figure 1: Study Locations in Northern Kenya 
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Figure 2: Structure of Double-bounded CV Method 
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Figure 3: WTP for 10% Strike Contract and Insured Proportion by Herd Size 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Demand for 10% Strike Contract by Herd Group 
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Appendix 1: Description of Variables 
 
Variable name Value Description 
CRRA (0,0.1,0.3,
0.4,0.7,1) 
Respondents were first given 100 Ksh for participating in the survey. They
can use this 100 Ksh to play one of the five 50/50 lotteries, which a fair coin
was then tossed to determine their real prize. 
Q: In this game, your chance of winning depends on a coin flip. If the coin
land on head (tail), you will win the amount below the head (tail) picture. You
can choose to keep 100 KSh for sure or choose to play one of the 5 games,
which one would you choose? 
(0) 100 KSh for sure                          (1) 130 KSh if head/ 80 KSh if tail 
(2) 160 KSh if head/ 60 KSh if tail    (3) 190 KSh if head/ 40 KSh if tail 
(4) 220 KSh if head/ 20 KSh if tail    (5) 240 KSh if head/ 0 KSh if tail 
We estimate the range of coefficients of relative risk aversion implied by each
possible choice of gambles under the assumption of CRRA utility: 
( )( ) ( ) ∑∑ ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−==
−
k
R
k
kk kk R
P
PUPUE
1
1
ππ  , ,0)( >′ PU  10 ≤≤ π and
k=1,2. π  represents probability of each possible payoff P and R is the
CRRA. In each choice, the upper (lower) bound of R can be calculated as the
value of R that generates same utility level for the payoffs associated with the
preferred gamble and the less (more) risky adjacent. Following Binswanger
(1980), CRRA are calculated by assigning mean measures to each of the
ranges using the geometric mean of the two end points.  In the case of gamble
5, a value of zero is given to the CRRA measure to represent a class of risk
neutral or risk seeker. The value of one is then assigned to the case of gamble
1 to represent the extremely risk averse class. Six risk aversion classifications
(extreme, severe, intermediate, moderate, low/neutral and neutral/risk seeker),
slightly similar to Binswanger (1980), are further assigned to each of the case
(see Table below). 
Discount rate (0,…,1) Implied monthly discount rate calculated from the minimum amount 
individual is willing to accept one month later. Q. Imagine that you have just 
won a prize of 10,000 KShs today. You can get 10,000 KShs now for sure. 
However, if you are willing to wait for one month, you can get more. (Keep 
asking and stop when respondent accepts the offer amount one month later) 
(1) 10,000 now/10,500 later?  (2) 10,000 now/11,000 later? 
(3) 10,000 now/12,000 later?  (4) 10,000 now/13,000 later? 
(5) 10,000 now/14,000 later?  (6) 10,000 now/15,000 later? 
(7) 10,000 now/16,000 later?  (8) 10,000 now/17,000 later? 
(9) how much does the prize need to be in order for you to wait for one 
month to receive it? 
Ambiguity aversion (0,1) Equal to 1 if individual is ambiguity averse, i.e. respondent selects pack 1 
with known probability of winning in the game: You need to choose a knife 
from one of the two packs to play the game. If the knife you choose is the 
right color, you will win 100 KSh. Which packs of knifes would you like to 
play? Pack 1 is a clear pack and so you can see that it contains 2 knifes with 
black paint and 3 knifes without black paint. You will win if you pick a knife 
(without looking) with black paint. Pack2 is a solid pack. It contains 5 
knifes, some with and without black paint. I don’t know for sure how many 
of each there are. You will win if you pick the knife that you specify.  
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Head education (1-
12 yrs) 
(0,1) Equal to 1 if household head has between 1-12 years of schooling. These 
represent the number of years spent up to secondary education. 
Head education 
(>12 yrs) 
(0,1) Equal to 1 if household head has any post-secondary education (e.g., 
diploma, university, etc.) 
Dependent ratio (0,…,∞ ) This is calculated by dividing the number of individuals under 15 years or  
over 64 years of age by the total household size. 
Member living 
away 
(0,1) Equal to 1 if household head reported having at least one household member 
currently living or working away from the community. 
% immature herd (0,1) This is calculated by one minus percentage of adult animals (at least 3 years 
old for cattle and camel, at least 6 months old for goat and sheep) 
% of mobile herd (0,1) This is the proportion of herd that has moved at least once over the past year 
in search for forage and water 
Ln(Income per 
capita) 
(0,…,∞ ) Ln(1+income) where economic income calculated from the sum of market 
value of milk and meat production, crop production, livestock trading, 
petting trading, other trades and business, wage and salary earnings. 
Share of income 
from livestock 
(0,1) This is the proportion of income that comes from livestock trading and sales 
of livestock and livestock products 
Ln(total livestock) (0,…,∞ ) Ln(1+total livestock) which only includes livestock that household owns. 
The total amounts are converted into an aggregate “Tropical Livestock Unit” 
(1 TLU = 1 cattle = 0.7 camel = 10 goat/sheep) 
Ln(total productive 
asset) 
(0,…,∞ ) Ln(1+productive asset), which includes non-local breed animals, shop and 
business, house of plot in town, vehicle, cell phone, etc., all valued in KSh. 
Ln(total non-
productive asset) 
(0,…,∞ ) Ln(1+non-productive asset), which includes household consumable goods, 
such as jewelry, clothing, furniture, all valued in KSh. 
Credit constrained (0,1) Equals to 1 if individual responses that they haven’t applied for 
(formal/informal) loan/credit since last year and citing reasons related to lack 
of credit. This equals to zero if they cite no need for credit. It also equals to 
one if they have applied for any (formal/informal) credit but have never 
gotten one since last year. 
Actively involved 
in group (s) 
(0,1) Equal to 1 if household cites livelihood-related group/association(s) (e.g., 
various women groups, milk production and marketing groups, financial 
service association (FSA), etc.) that they actively involve in and that they 
can call up any member of this group for assistance.   
Experience very 
bad long rain 2008  
(0,1) Equal 1 if response “Much below normal” to the question: Please tell me 
your opinion and experience about the amount of long rain 2008 ( Much 
below normal/Somewhat below normal/Normal/Somewhat above 
normal/Much above normal) 
% years with 
loss>200% own 
mean 
(0,…,1) Proportion of years in 11 years of historical annual herd loss recalls (1997-
2007) with losses exceeding 200% of individual-specific mean annual 
livestock loss. The recall exercise asked about total and losses for each 
species each year. 
Correlations 
(m_it,m_t) beyond 
10% loss 
(-1,…,1) Correlations between individual annual rates of herd losses beyond 10% 
(i.e.,Max(0,mit-0.1)) and area averaged rates beyond 10% (i.e., Max(0,m_t-
0.1)) calculated from 11 years of loss recalls (1997-2007).  
Expected % loss in 
2009  
(0,0.1,0.2,
0.3,…,1) 
Response to Q: What proportions of your herd do you think you will lose in 
the next 12 months from now? (None, 1/10, 2/10, 3/10,…, All, No idea) 
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Problem 1st 2st most 3st most weighted
concern concern concern sum
Livestock loss due to drought/excessive rain 169 17 15 44%
Livestock loss due to disease outbreak 23 77 27 20%
Livestock loss due to conflict/raiding 2 16 35 6%
Milk production loss due to drought/excessive rain 5 50 57 14%
Crop fail due to drought/excessive rain 1 3 4 1%
Low market access and low selling price of livestock 4 28 38 8%
High food price 1 5 10 2%
Loss of business/trade 3 1 1 1%
Illness and death 0 5 8 1%
Insecurity and violence 1 7 14 2%
Others 0 0 0 0%
Coping strategies 1st 2st most 3st most weighted
concern concern concern sum
Reducing household consumption 62 23 15 20%
Utilization of asset and saving 91 48 22 31%
Obtaining credit from various sources 44 83 46 27%
Seeking alternative livelihood 6 45 12 10%
Outside assistance from others, governments, NGO, etc. 6 10 114 12%
Rik management strategies 1st 2st most weighted
concern concern sum
Save more money 99 30 36%
Increase grain stocking 23 23 11%
Expand herd size 8 12 4%
Decrease herd size (through loaning and sales) 71 92 37%
Purchase more supplemental feeds/vetenary inputs 1 32 5%
Allocate some household members/investments to other ag 6 18 5%
Others 1 2 1%
Appendix 2: Risk Perception and Existing Coping Strategies 
 
Please rank the three problems that you are most concerned of and have difficulty to cope 
given your household's resources, skills and networks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In times when your household faced with major livestock losses, please rank the three 
most important strategies that your household used to cope with those losses? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please provide the two most important actions you take to prepare your household upon 
your expectation of catastrophic herd loss. 
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Gamble High Low Expected S.D. CRRA ranges Geometric mean Risk aversion class
Choice Payoff Payoff Payoff Payoff CRRA
1 100 100 100 0 r>0.99* 1.0 Extreme
2 130 80 105 25 0.55<r<0.99* 0.7 Severe
3 160 60 110 50 0.32<r<0.55 0.4 Intermediate
4 190 40 115 75 0.21<r<0.32 0.3 Moderate
5 220 20 120 100 0<r<0.21 0.1 Low/Neutral
6 240 0 120 120 r<0 0.0 Neutral/risk seeking
Appendix 3: Summary of Setting of Risk Preference Elicitation 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: *Without assumption of 1≤r , the actual value of r is 1.67. 
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Appendix 4: Heckman’s Two Step Estimation and Correction for covariance Matrix 
 
The first step ordered probit model is defined as 
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where jα  represents unknown threshold with assumed −∞=0α  and +∞=4α .  
Consider a simple second-step WTP model: 
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And so, using Heckman’s approach to estimation, one can write for 4,3,2,1=j : 
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With )()())(Pr( 11111 βαβα ijiji XXjhh ′−Φ−′−Φ== − , the IMRs for household i with a 
chosen insured proportion )( jhhi =  can be represented by 
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where )(⋅φ represents a normal probability distribution function and an indicator function 
1))(( ==Ι jhhi  if )( jhhi =  and = 0 otherwise. 
 Using these, we can fully describe the two-step estimation we use, which closely 
follows that of Heckman’s two-step estimator described in Greene (2002). The first step 
is to estimate the ordered probit model using maximum likelihood. The estimated 
),( 1βα ′  is then used to estimate iλ . The maximum likelihood estimator ),( 2 λββ can then 
be estimated from the second-step WTP model with ),( 2 iiX λ as regressors. The corrected 
asymptotic covariance matrix for this two step estimator can be derived as 
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1 ˆ/ˆˆ uu σβρ λ=  
 ]ˆ[δdiag=Δ     and Σ is asymptotic variance matrix of the first step regression. 
 
Making this adjustment for corrected asymptotic variance matrix thus yields efficient 
estimates for the second-step estimators. 
